Andrew N. Kleit is Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics and MICASU Faculty Fellow. His current research interests are focused on the areas of competition in electricity and natural gas markets. He is the author or editor of over 70 academic articles and seven books. He has worked at several different regulatory agencies, including the President’s Council of Economic Advisors, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
- Electricity Capacity Markets (with Todd Aagard. Forthcoming Cambridge University Press) Billions of dollars are spent each year by electricity consumers on “capacity markets,” which have the stated purpose of protecting electricity reliability. This will be the first book length work on this important area. Issues to be explored include how these markets are structured, how decisions are made for these markets, and whether these markets truly reach their goal of enhancing reliability, or merely represent an opportunity for the transfer of funds. Other topics to be investigated are whether capacity market prices are biased upward, to the advantage of producers and the harm of consumers, how renewable energy sources fit into capacity markets, and evaluations of other methods of creating reliable electricity markets.
- Modern Energy Market Competition (Emerald Press, November 2018). As long as commodity and securities markets have been in operation, market manipulation has been a serious concern. Now that many electricity and natural gas markets have been opened to competition, manipulation threatens to destroy the value of these markets as well. Yet market manipulation itself remains ill-defined, with uncertain legal and economic principles operating on both sides of regulatory proceedings. This book explores this crucial gray area. It presents a coherent definition of market manipulation, and applies it a variety of legal context. It examines two categories of manipulation cases. In the first, the allegations fit the definition of manipulation, but the facts of the case are unclear. In the second, the facts of the case are clear, but whether or not these events constitute manipulation is unclear. The work casts a critical eye not only on the actions of energy companies but also the legal decisions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
- The Economics of Natural Gas Refracturing . Natural gas markets have been transformed by hydraulic fracturing. This has created several interesting research topics. I have joined with my colleagues John Wang and Eugene Morgan to investigate whether the legal rule of capture is obsolete for refractured natural gas wells. my colleague Arash Dahi and I are working on a project to determine when gas companies decide to shut in their well. Keith Crocker of the Smeal College of Business and I are analyzing the market for resale of natural gas production royalties. Finally, Anastasia Scherbakova of Texas A&M University and I are conducting a study of the creation of production units in the hydraulic fracturing of natural gas.
- Electricity Capacity Markets: (with Todd S. Aagard). Forthcoming, Cambridge University Press.
- Modern Energy Market Manipulation (Emerald Publishing, 2018).
- “Deregulation and Firm Investment Incentives: Evidence from Nuclear Power Uprates," (with Lee and Tsai), Energy Journal. May 2017, 38:3 (2017) 113-39
- “Why Invest in Wind Energy? Career Incentives and Chinese Renewable Energy Politics Energy Policy,” (with Xun Cao and Chuyu Liu), 99 Energy Policy (2016) 120-131.
- "Contingent Efficiency in Natural Gas Leases," (with Dan Cahoy). Texas Journal of Oil, Gas, and Energy Law, 11 (2016) 89.